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CRISES AND MERCHANT NETWORKS IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY: 
THE CASE Of GERMAN NETWORKS IN LOMbARDY
Monika Poettinger
Abstract: During the nineteenth century in Continental Europe, merchant networks 
founded enterprises wherever comparative or absolute advantages related to natural 
resources or workers’ capabilities, but also changing economic policies, made it profitable. 
Incessantly comparing the cost-effectiveness of investments, merchant networks 
enhanced the efficiency of the entire economic system, but also favoured innovation, 
introducing technological advancements when feasible and potentially remunerative. At 
the same time, though, economic crises, more and more dependent on manufacturing 
and less on agricultural cycles, became manifest and an object of theoretical debate. The 
paper analyzes how merchant networks envisioned economic crises, if at all, and how 
the economic decision processes of such organizational structures responded to them. 
It will be ascertained that, more than sectorial imbalances and insufficient demand, the 
crisis that merchants really feared was the end of credibility and thus of access to credit. 
Personal failure could dramatically reduce the level of trust, depriving the merchant 
system of its functioning principle. The chosen framework of analysis describes the actual 
economic decision process, on which the distribution of production depended, and its 
relation to economic cycles. 
Introduction
During the nineteenth century in Continental Europe the entrepreneurial 
function1 was mainly performed by merchant networks. These networks,2 
made out of loose ties between international merchant houses, négociants or 
negozianti,3 founded enterprises wherever comparative or absolute advantages 
1 A definition of entrepreneurial function can be found in Monika Poettinger, “Lo 
sviluppo economico lombardo ed i network imprenditoriali”, Mitteilungen 10 (2007), pp. 
152-154.
2 On networks and international businesses, see Mark C. Casson, “Entrepreneurial 
Networks in International businesses”, Business and Economic History 26 (1997), pp. 811-
823.
3 An apt definition of such merchant houses was first given by Daniel Defoe in 1726: 
“but in England the word merchant is understood of none but such as carry on foreign 
correspondences, importing the goods and growth of other countries, and exporting the 
growth and manufacture of England to other countries; or, to use a vulgar expression, 
because I am speaking to and of those who use that expression, such as trade beyond the sea. 
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12 Monika Poettinger 
related to natural resources or workers’ capabilities, but also changing economic 
policies, made it profitable. Incessantly comparing the cost-effectiveness 
of investments, merchant networks enhanced the efficiency of the entire 
economic system by channelling capital, resources and entrepreneurs where 
the highest return was guaranteed. They also favoured innovation, introducing 
technological advancements whenever feasible and potentially remunerative. 
At the same time, though, as merchant networks increasingly organized 
trade and production on the Continent,4 economic crises, more and more 
dependent on manufacturing and less on agricultural cycles, became 
manifest and an object of theoretical debate.5 Wilhelm Roscher would 
even venture to say6 that such crises, regularly afflicting Europe every nine 
to ten years, were the consequence of the spreading of these networks. It 
would thus be meaningful to ascertain how merchant networks envisioned 
economic crises, if at all, and how the economic decision processes of such 
organizational structures responded to the same crises. Such a study, shown 
below, will be micro-based, having as a unit of analysis the merchant house 
and its network. Contemporary theoretical analyses will be briefly considered 
with the perceptions and actions of nineteenth-century merchants. The 
subsequent sections will relate how merchant networks reacted to crises as a 
source of entrepreneurial opportunities or as a cause to change the network 
of pertinence and so the given distribution of resources and production 
across borders. More than sectorial imbalances and insufficient demand, 
then, what the crisis merchants really feared was the end of credibility and 
These in England, and these only, are called merchants, by way of honourable distinction.” 
Daniel Defoe, The Complete English Tradesman, London: bibliobazaar, 2008, p. 18.
4 On the case of Greece and the Ottoman Empire, see Maria Christina Chatziioannou, 
“Creating the Pre-Industrial Ottoman-Greek Merchant: Sources, Methods and Inter-
pretations”, in Lorans Tanatar baruh and V. Kechriotis (eds), Economy and Society on Both 
Shores of the Aegean, Αthens: Alpha bank Historical Archives, 2010, pp. 311-335. On the case 
of German networks, see Monika Poettinger (ed.), German Merchant and Entrepreneurial 
Migrations, Lugano: Casagrande Editore, 2012. On the british case, see Stanley Chapman, 
Merchant Enterprise in Britain: From the Industrial Revolution to World War I, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004.
5 See Daniele besomi, “‘Periodic Crises’: Clément Juglar between Theories of Crises and 
Theories of business Cycles”, in Jeff E. biddle and Ross b. Emmett (eds), A Research Annual, 
Research in the History of Economic Thought and Methodology, Vol. XXVIII, bingley: 
Emerald Group Publishing Ltd, 2010, pp. 169-283. 
6 Wilhelm Roscher, “Die Produktionskrisen, mit besonderer Rücksicht auf die letzten 
Jahrzehnte”, in Die Gegenwart eine Encyklopädische Darstellung der neuesten Zeitgeschichte 
für alle Stände, brockhaus 1849, Vol. ΙΙΙ, pp. 721-758.
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thus of access to credit. Personal failure could dramatically reduce the level 
of trust, depriving the merchant system of its functioning principle. The final 
section will highlight how merchant networks faced such an ultimate crisis, 
limiting its consequences on the whole netlike organizational structure. 
The chosen framework of analysis thus represents the actual economic 
decision process, on which the distribution of production on the Continent 
during the nineteenth century depended, and its relation to economic cycles. 
Merchant Networks and Economic Crises: Theory and Practice
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, theoretical debates centred on 
the validity of Say’s law. The existence of economic crises7 was not doubted; 
what was disputed was if they were only sectorial and limited in time or 
could become general, affecting the equilibrium between production and 
consumption. It is to be noted that Jean-baptiste Say himself considered 
the investment decision process fundamental to the solution of sectorial 
imbalances. Differing profit rates amongst sectors would prompt investors 
to funnel capital into the most rewarding sectors, adjusting production to 
demand. The general equilibrium of the system would so be granted along 
with its efficiency. 
In so doing, Say quite perfectly depicted the mercantile economy of his 
time. Merchant networks readily organized production across time and space 
so as to adjust it to a never-exhausting demand. Starting in the eighteenth 
century, be it for porcelain, linen, silk, cotton pieces or sugar, demand grew all 
over the Continent. Trade of foreign luxury goods, organized by international 
merchant houses, had generated consumption, frenzied in some cases, that 
prompted merchants to finance the production in loco of the new wares. 
“Such manufactures, therefore, are the offspring of foreign commerce,” 
explained Adam Smith, “They have been introduced in the manner above 
mentioned, by the violent operation, if one may say so, of the stocks of 
particular merchants and undertakers, who established them in imitation of 
some foreign manufactures of the same kind.”8 The main economic problem 
then was not the scarcity of demand. As old productions turned out to be 
7 On the concept of crisis in broad terms and also in economics, see Reinhart Koselleck, 
“Krise”, in Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe. Historisches Lexicon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache 
in Deutschland , ed. Otto brunner, Werner Konze and Reinhart Koselleck, 8 vols, Stuttgart: 
Klett-Cotta, 1972-1997, Vol. III, pp. 617-650.
8 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Vol. III, 
London: Charles Knight, 1836, p. 43.
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obsolete and new ones emerged, the role of merchant houses became that of 
Say’s investors: to select the sectors granting the highest returns and organize 
scarce resources to produce the demanded items. Merchants thus became 
manufacturers but also arbiters of the international division of labour and, 
by choosing the capital intensity of production, of the distribution of income. 
The investment decision process, though, once easily done by comparing 
buying to selling prices of traded wares, had now to take into account the costs of 
organizing manufacturing premises and of continuously evolving technology. 
Risks, once pertaining to travel routes and means, now included incessantly 
changing relative advantages, causing relevant sunk costs. Such continuously 
shifting circumstances generated many sectorial imbalances, as innovation and 
mercantilist measures on the part of governments changed the circumstances 
on which investment decisions were taken. Nonetheless, these crises were 
not perceived as such by merchants. The netlike organizational structure 
of international merchant houses granted the flexibility and the adaptability 
needed to meet such challenges with success. Entrepreneurs and merchants were 
ready to migrate, sometimes more than once, to find the location where their 
aptitudes would generate the highest profits. An alternative to such economic 
wandering was changing the sector of activity, adapting investments to the 
changed incentives. Adam Smith said, with more than a hint of condemnation: 
Sudden fortunes, indeed, are sometimes made in such places, by what 
is called the trade of speculation. The speculative merchant exercises 
no one regular, established, or well-known branch of business. He 
is a corn merchant this year, and a wine merchant the next, and a 
sugar, tobacco or tea merchant the year after. He enters into every 
trade, when he foresees that it is likely to lie more than commonly 
profitable, and he quits it when he foresees that its profits are likely to 
return to the level of other trades.9 
Exactly the trait Smith so reproached, the flexibility in investment strategy 
based on extensive commerce and correspondence, generated the highest 
return on capital and the diffusion of innovative productions all over the 
Continent: efficiency and development at once. Say’s sectorial crises would 
otherwise condemn all those who stuck to just one trade, one manufacture 
or one production process to failure, while merchant houses acting 
internationally through netlike organizations flourished in the risky and 
uncertain environment that nineteenth-century Europe was.
What about general crises though? What about the failing of Say’s law?
9 Id., An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Vol. I, Dublin: 
N. Kelly, 1801, p. 115.
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Clément Juglar, as did many of his contemporaries, noted the regularity 
of overproduction crises and the ensuing financial crises, at least in countries 
such as Great britain, the United States and france starting from the 1820s.10 
An instability of the economic system began to emerge that many thought 
a chronic and incurable malady. The cost-reducing innovations related to 
technological advancement would cause an unbridgeable rift between offer 
and demand, contended some; the distribution of income would be altered to 
the detriment of consumption, contended others. Introducing a time-lapse 
between the earning of income and its use as investments or consumption, 
through the monetization of the economy and the diffusion of credit, recited 
a spreading common wisdom, would inevitably sweep away the validity of 
Say’s law. The time of equilibrium, in economy as in society, was at its end, 
and chaos in the form of full warehouses and famished populations would 
dominate the future of industrialized Europe.
It is highly doubtful that international merchants would ever subscribe 
to such catastrophic views. Although the stagnation of trade and excessive 
financial speculation were common and recurring objects of recrimination 
in merchants’ journals, writings and letters,11 the close-knit world of private 
banks, trading networks and innovating entrepreneurs that governed most of 
Continental Europe’s production was generally untouched by the recurring 
crises. There were always other markets to be opened, technologies to be 
introduced, monopolies to be gained, protections to be demanded, and new 
sectors to be exploited. The world was still to be fully explored and crises 
limited to a few developed countries. As Joseph A. Schumpeter would later 
acknowledge,12 the innovating entrepreneur had been the pivotal point of 
the economy’s up- and downswings of the nineteenth century, completely 
at ease in its ebbs and flows. ‘Crisis’ would not be a term merchants would 
associate to the economy in general, because changing circumstances always 
harboured opportunities for someone disposed to innovate, migrate or 
change in any other way her/his business. 
What about labourers whose qualifications had become obsolete, then, 
and what about consumers strangled by insufficient income? The flexibility of 
merchants left ruins, where comparative advantages were lost in consequence 
of new trade flows or technological advancements. As Adam Smith reproached: 
10 See Pascal bridel and Muriel Dal-Pont Legrand (eds), Clément Juglar (1819-1905). 
Les origines de la théorie des cycles, Geneva and Paris: Librairie Droz, 2009.
11 Monika Poettinger, “forme d’impresa, socializzazione del capitale e innovazione 
nella Milano di metá Ottocento”, Rivista di Storia Economica 2 (2011), pp. 182-185.
12 Alfredo Salsano (ed.), Alois Schumpeter. L’imprenditore e la storia dell’impresa. Scritti, 
1927-1949, Turin: bollati boringhieri, 1993.
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A merchant, it has been said very properly, is not necessarily the 
citizen of any particular country. It is in a great measure indifferent 
to him from what place he carries on his trade; and a very trifling 
disgust will make him remove his capital, and, together with it, all 
the industry which it supports, from one country to another. No part 
of it can be said to belong to any particular country, till it has been 
spread, as it were, over the face of that country, either in buildings, or 
in the lasting improvement of lands.13
Where merchants really the cause of local economic disasters by selfishly 
dedicating themselves uniquely to their own profit? In effect, the socialist 
idea was grounded in the defying of Say’s law and seemingly condemned 
merchants to the role of Ebenezer Scrooge. Wherever and whenever 
merchants gained economic primacy and political representation, though, 
local development always included investments in the technical instruction 
of workers, the foundation of societies for the development of arts and crafts, 
the diffusion of schooling and the setting-up of a net of social securities 
and mutual companies. The detrimental effect that varying comparative 
advantages, technological innovations and costs containments inevitably 
had on the living conditions of labourers could be countered in the long run 
by their increasing and continuing qualification and requalification.14 When 
all else failed, an international merchant such as Heinrich Mylius, a banker 
transplanted from frankfurt to Milan at the end of the eighteenth century, 
would even finance the construction of a panoramic street in the heights 
of Loveno on Lake Como to “help the poor bridge a difficult winter”,15 an 
ante litteram Keynesian measure that summarizes many an effort done by 
merchants to restore an apparently lost general economic equilibrium.
Sectorial Crises as Entrepreneurial Opportunities
At the end of the eighteenth century, enlightened governments dedicated to 
the new, flourishing manufactures an increased attention as means to counter 
unemployment and social unrest. Wherever old, established productions 
languished due to the introduction of new, cheaper or more beautiful wares, 
governments tried to solve the ensuing sectorial and local economic crisis 
through protection and import substitution. The ensuing entrepreneurial 
opportunities were best exploited by international networks of merchant 
13 Smith, An Inquiry, Vol. III, p. 67.
14 Monika Poettinger, “Etica mercantile e sviluppo economic”, Societá e Storia 125 
(2009), pp. 465-502.
15 A commemorative notice posted along the same panoramic street in 1853.
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houses, able to coalesce temporarily into a firm that collected capital and 
technical capabilities from wherever abundant and transferred them to the new 
location, where higher returns, due to scarcity and government protection, 
were expected. Such ventures lasted only as long as initial conditions remained 
valid, resulting in a high mobility of factors and relevant entrepreneurial 
migration flows across the Continent. 
An example of this practice is the case of Kramer & Compagni, a firm 
founded in Milan in 1782 (see Table 1). The entrepreneurial occasion was 
given by state aid, granted by the Austrian government through the elevation 
of a tariff, to save a local cotton printing manufactory and expand its business 
to include the spinning and weaving of cotton in the northern provinces of 
Lombardy, where the old and established trade of bombazines had been 
almost completely wiped out.16 Given this precise scope, state officials offered 
the bankrupt firm to its former Swiss supplier of printable cotton pieces, 
Johann Adam Krämer,17 a young entrepreneurial talent who, as did many, 
migrated around Europe in search of the best reward for his knowledge, 
trying to acquire the capital necessary to found his own enterprise. Krämer 
contributed to the venture his knowledge of the production process of cotton 
pieces, an unknown technique in Lombardy, but very little capital and no 
capacity at all for the printing of cotton. To save the bankrupt printing 
activity, Krämer associated to his firm a young entrepreneur from Augsburg, 
Johann Paul Hartmann, scion of a family involved in the trading of Swiss 
cotton pieces and the flourishing cotton printing business.18
16 Monika Poettinger, “The Mercantile Network Economy and the Mechanization 
of Cotton Spinning and Printing in Milan (1760-1815)”, in Poettinger (ed.), German 
Merchant and Entrepreneurial Migrations pp. 260-266.
17 Gio. Adamo Kramer, as he was always known in Milan, was born in 1753 in Essenheim, 
a little German town near frankfurt that experienced a long-lasting emigration wave during 
the eighteenth century. Krämer himself moved from Essenheim to Zurich, where he found 
employment and acquired experience in a Verlag [i.e a printing manufacture] of printable 
cotton pieces, then he moved to Milan. All genealogical data on Johann Adam Krämer in 
Milan are to be found in the Censimento (1811), Vol. XX, ad nomen, and the Censimento 
(1835), Vol. XXVIII, ad nomen, “Rubrica del ruolo generale della popolazione”. Archivio 
biblioteca Trivulziana (hereafter AbT), Milan. for a biographical sketch, see Monika 
Poettinger, “Imprenditori tedeschi nella Lombardia del primo Ottocento. Spirito mercantile, 
capitale sociale ed industrializzazione”, Rivista di Storia Economica 23 (2007), pp. 319-360.
18 Johann Michael Hartmann owned a merchant house dealing with Swiss products and 
was the contact between Krämer and Johann Paul Hartmann. In the 1780s the Hartmanns 
diversified their activity by direct involvement in the cotton printing manufactory. Johann 
Gottfried Hartmann bought the Apfel’sche Druckerei in Augsburg in partnership with 
Johann Michael Schöppler. Schöppler & Hartmann became, next to the famous Schüle 
mill, one of the most important printers of Augsburg in the last decades of the eighteenth 
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Table 1
Originating network of Kramer & Compagni, Milan 1782
from Augsburg came also 30% of the 100,000 florins capital of the venture, 
invested by one of Augsburg’s three Catholic banks, Carli & Co. Two Zurich 
merchant houses, Salomon Traxler and frey & Pestalozzi, both with previous 
involvement in Verlag [printing manufacture] production and the silk trade, 
financed another 30% each. Only the remaining 10% was financed by Krämer 
and Hartmann. Yet the form of limited partnership, typical for most of these 
international ventures, valued human and entrepreneurial capital as much as 
financial capital, and profits were divided accordingly: 25% went to Krämer, 
15% to Hartmann and 20% to each limited partner (See Table 2). 
Kramer & Compagni is a fairly typical case of how mercantile networks 
responded to varying incentives across Continental Europe during indu-
strialization. Once an entrepreneurial occasion arose, existing networks 
century. Later the venture was successfully led by Johann Gottfried Hartmann’s son-in-
law, Karl foster. See Paul von Stetten, Beschreibung der Reichs-Stadt Augsburg, Augsburg 
1788, pp. 133-138; and “Handlung und Manufakturen der Stadt Augsburg”, Handlungs 
Zeitung [Gotha] 29 (19 July 1788).
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funnelled resources from excellent production sites, in this case Zurich for 
the Verlag of printable cotton pieces19 and Augsburg for cotton printing, 
and financed the setting-up of the new venture.20 The related migration was 
not limited to entrepreneurs. Krämer “procured with great difficulties entire 
families from Switzerland”21 apt in the spinning and weaving of cotton and able 
to teach such operations to local workers, while Hartmann arrived in Milan 
with precious human capital: a colourist and a designer, the most important 
specialized workers a printing manufacture required for success. 
In time Kramer & Compagni became the first venture to introduce a mule 
jenny in Lombardy and further implemented many innovative production 
processes in the printing sector. Innovation was thus the result of the 
interaction between mercantilist protection and the ability of international 
trading networks to move resources and production processes from centres 
of excellence to backward regions.
19 In this manufacturing sector, Swiss districts, such as the outskirts of Zurich, 
held almost a monopoly in Europe, having accumulated a long-lasting comparative 
advantage in the years when cotton printing had been outlawed in nearby france. Such a 
comparative advantage was not yet of a technical nature, like the one England was soon 
to acquire through mechanization, but resided in skilled labourers and early chemical 
and mechanical abilities. Even Peel, the biggest English cotton printer, had to admit the 
superiority of Swiss craftsmanship in 1786: “We are excelled... – he affirmed about the 
production of printable pieces – in Switzerland both in execution and cheapness.”; quoted 
in Stanley D. Chapman and Serge Chassagne, European Textile Printers in the Eighteenth 
Century, London 1981, p. 88.
20 “Augsburg at the moment is much more advanced than other locations only in the 
preparation of the necessary colours,” wrote Paul von Stetten in 1779 in his historical 
representation of the Reichsstadt. See Paul von Stetten, Kunst-, Gewerb- und Handwerks 
Geschichte der Reichs-Stadt Augsburg, Vol. I, Augsburg 1779, p. 253.
21 Memorandum (or Promemoria) of the firm Kramer & Compagni, 8 April 1791. 
Archivio Storico di Milano [hereafter ASM], fondo Commercio, p.a., cart. 252.
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Table 2
Capital composition of Kramer & Compagni
Firm Capital composition
Kramer & 
Compagni
Milan,
1782-1807
 
Kramer & 
Compagni
Milan,
1807-1814
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While closing down a market, as in the case of Kramer & Compagni, 
could result in the introduction of production in locations with comparative 
disadvantages, there was also the case when opening or enlarging markets 
caused the foundation of firms in comparatively advantaged countries to 
exploit economies of scale. A fitting example of this kind of incentive and the 
reaction of merchant networks is the Austrian linen sector after the Restoration. 
following the distortions induced by the Continental System, the return of 
Austrian rule in Lombardy abruptly reintroduced the region into the common 
economic area of the Austrian Empire. Local merchant houses had to adapt 
to the new institutional and economic setting, adjusting their investments. 
Enrico Mylius & Compagni, a banking and trading house of German origin 
based in Milan, consequently decided to intensify trade by importing the high-
quality linen products of Upper Austria’s provinces22 and particularly from the 
Mühlviertel, a region with a lengthy tradition in that sector.23 The abolition of 
all guilds in 1801 and the distortions imposed by Napoleonic policies, though, 
had severely damaged the local economy and impoverished the 18,000 linen 
spinners and weavers working in the domestic system, centred on the market of 
Haslach. In consequence, conditions were favourable for profitably introducing 
the same kind of Verlag production, or cottage industry, that was typical for 
Lombardy’s silk sector, in which Mylius successfully operated. To exploit such 
entrepreneurial opportunity, a younger member of a Swiss family involved in 
Mylius’ trading network was chosen. Johann Niklaus Vonwiller had until then 
acted as a business traveller, while his brother, David, at the beginning of the 
century, had profited from the Continental System by setting up a complex 
network for the production of cotton in Naples.24 In 1819, on his part, Niklaus 
Vonwiller, financed by Enrico Mylius & Compagni, founded a bank in Milan 
and a trading subsidiary in Haslach. The Austrian branch would manage the 
flourishing trade between the two provinces of the Empire, but also the Verlag 
production of high-quality linen. The old master weavers of Haslach thus 
became dependent Faktoren, working exclusively for Vonwiller’s trading house 
22 See Monika Poettinger, Deutsche Unternehmer im Mailand des neunzehnten 
Jahrhunderts. Netzwerke, soziales Kapital und Industrialisierung, Lugano: Casagrande 
Editore, 2012, pp. 172-176.
23 benedikt Pillwein (ed.), Geschichte, Geographie und Statistik des Erzherzogthums 
Oesterreich ob der Enns und des Herzogthums Salzburg. Erster Theil: Der Mülkreis, Linz: 
Quandt, 1827.
24 See Daniela L. Caglioti, Vite parallele. Una minoranza protestante nell’Italia dell’ 
Ottocento, bologna: Il Mulino, 2006; Dieter Richter, Napoli cosmopolita. Viaggiatori e 
comunità straniere nell’Ottocento, Napoli: Electa, 2002.
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and organizing their homemade work on its behalf. The merchant house had 
an exclusive relationship with the homeworkers, who could buy raw materials 
and working tools only from it, while it retained the right to buy at a given 
price only as much finished product as it wished, de facto transferring most 
of the entrepreneurial risk onto the dependent Faktoren. Such organizational 
innovation was so successful that the Milan trading house employed thousands 
of Faktoren all over the Mühlviertel, up to the River Vltava, irreversibly altering 
the local economic and social system. 
One decade later, even the successive step from proto-industrialization to 
the factory system was completed. Given the high profits gained by the Verlag, 
in 1830 the local trading manager of Vonwiller, Wolfgang Alois fririon, was 
entrusted with the erection of an imposing factory in which weavers would 
be put to work under one roof, while finishing operations could be completed 
through water power (see Table 3). This change transformed the seasonal 
Faktoren into full-time workers, allowing, at the same time, a stricter control 
over the quality of their work by supervisors. The use of water power, on its 
part, diminished costs while improving the uniformity and appearance of the 
finished product; again, an organizational transformation that manifoldly 
increased productivity. 
In Lombardy, trade in the Mühlviertel’s linen boomed. The region, estimated 
the Austrian government, generated a demand of 1.5 million Gulden that 
could not be adequately covered by the low quality of local linen production.25 
Not even the factory of Vonwiller could satiate it. In consequence, another 
trading house from Milan, Pietro Simonetta, equally supported by Enrico 
Mylius & Compagni, built a similar factory in Helfenberg with the same 
rationale. Nothing of the sort had ever been seen in the valleys surrounding 
Haslach: huge, dominating buildings, stories high, that obstructed the view of 
the former peaceful, agrarian surroundings, Molochs that swallowed men as 
water, constraining their free flow and work.
Historiography, in effect, marks the erection of these factories as the starting 
point of industrialization in Upper Austria. During the 1840s, Vonwiller’s mill 
hosted 360 weavers, while Simonetta reported 1000 workers in his premises. 
The official report on the third general Austrian manufacturing exhibition, 
held in Vienna in 1845, boasted, “by operating 8000 looms, Upper Austria has 
a yearly production of up to 200,000 linen pieces, 30 ells long, corresponding 
to a value of 1 million Gulden. The biggest factories belong to Vonwiller and 
25 Bericht über die Dritte allgemeine österreichische Gewerbe-Ausstellung in Wien 1845, 
Vienna: K. K. Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1846, p. 327.
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Comp. in Haslach, Simonetti [sic] in Helfenberg, Kamka in Zwettl and Wurm 
in Neumarktl near Linz.”26
In the Austrian region, the factory system, if not the full mechanization 
of the production process, was brought about by the direct investments of 
Lombardy’s merchant houses and the entrepreneurial migration of younger 
members of the related families. In this case, no particular technological 
knowledge was necessary to exploit the opportunity offered by the opening 
of trading space amongst Austria’s provinces after the Restoration. The 
entrepreneurial advantage of Lombardy’s houses consisted in the availability 
of capital, necessary to finance the Verlag, in the organizational knowledge 
needed to set up the cottage industry first and the factories later on, and lastly 
in the knowledge of the end market.
The two illustrated cases, cotton printing in Milan at the end of the 
eighteenth century and linen production in Upper Austria in the first half 
of the nineteenth century, clarify the interplay between varying incentives, 
related to state interventions in regions subject to sectorial crises, and 
economic decisions of merchant networks that brought about the foundations 
of firms and the related diffusion of innovation in Continental Europe during 
industrialization. Milan has been depicted once as the receiving country 
for Swiss and bavarian investments thanks to the protection offered by the 
Austrian government, while in the second example the increased trade with 
Austrian provinces after the Restoration prompted Milan’s trading houses to 
replicate the local Verlag production of silk and the factory system of cotton 
in the linen sector of Upper Austria. As seen, it was knowledge of markets 
and techniques and organizational capabilities that gave international trading 
houses an unbeatable advantage in exploiting entrepreneurial opportunities 
arising far away from already existing centres of excellence. The resulting 
entrepreneurial migration, sustained by merchant houses with capital and 
resources, diffused efficiency and innovation in regions that had suffered 
acutely from the dying out of formerly flourishing productions.
Sectorial Crises as Stimulus for Change
State intervention, as seen, could create many an entrepreneurial opportunity, 
salvaging entire regions from the consequences of sectorial crises due to 
changing consumer demand or comparative advantages. There was always 
a flip side of the coin, though. Changing economic incentives, reversing 
investment decisions and countering comparative advantages was a process of 
26 Ibid.
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creative destruction: whenever entrepreneurial opportunities were generated 
in a region, another region lost its own. Networks were able to exploit the new 
advantages, but how would they cope with the reversing of existing ones?
The setting up of the Continental System in the first years of the nine-
teenth century was the first and foremost example of massive political 
intervention in the economy, useful for analyzing the reaction of merchant 
networks to the destructive effect of changing economic conditions. In effect, 
the Napoleonic measures were followed by an unprecedented repositioning 
of investments across borders. The Rhine River, for example, witnessed 
a general migration of production facilities from its right to its left banks, 
while Switzerland, as with many Austrian and German provinces, lost much 
of its textile production.27 Certain wares and raw materials abruptly became 
unavailable, prompting substitution through hastily set up local cultivations 
or manufactures. Cotton was one of those, and the cited entrepreneurial 
adventure of David Vonwiller in Naples exemplifies one of the solutions 
pursued by international merchant networks. 
In Lombardy, Kramer & Compagni lost its capitalists, and Hartmann also 
decided to set up his own network for the trading of cotton between Trieste, 
Milan and Naples, leaving the partnership.28 Incentives had changed, and the 
original partnership was dissolved. Krämer himself invested in real estate 
and government provisions and gave up the mechanical manufacturing of 
cotton. The printing activity, though, profited from the french Court that 
ruled Italy residing in Milan and was worth pursuing. Having severed the 
link to Augsburg, Krämer resorted to his Swiss contacts to build up a new 
network through which capital and innovation could flow to his manufactory 
from the most advanced manufacturing centres in Europe. He soon found an 
eager investor in frères Merian, a merchant house of basel, heavily involved 
in the booming smuggling business until the catastrophic Neuenburg Affair. 
After Napoleon’s personal threats, frères Merian had been obliged to change 
its investments. Unable to continue its Verlag production in Switzerland, 
due to french protectionism, it changed strategy towards direct foreign 
investments, financing cotton printers in imperial territories; hence, it 
invested in Dollfus, Mieg & Cie in Mulhouse and also in the newly founded 
Kramer & Compagni. The capital composition of the Milan cotton printer 
completely altered (see Table 2): Kramer & Compagni was now able to supply 
27 Eli f. Heckscher, The Continental System: An Economic Interpretation, New York: 
Cosimo Classics, 2006, pp. 295-320.
28 Poettinger, Deutsche Unternehmer im Mailand, pp. 68-70.
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half of the capital, while one fourth each was invested by frères Merian 
and Dollfus, Mieg & Cie. from Mulhouse Krämer also obtained precious 
organizational capital: Rodolphe Grossmann, former partner of Dollfus, who 
would from then on direct the printing activities of Kramer & Compagni in 
Milan. Grossmann’s knowledge would also be decisive in erecting the new 
mechanized printing factory of La Pace, which increased the annual potential 
production to 65,700 pieces a year (see Table 3). In the case of Krämer in 
Milan, as in Alsace, incentives had become favourable to the introduction of 
an innovation – cylinder printing – which guaranteed enormous returns in 
terms of economies of scale, but had to rely on markets sufficiently extended 
to justify it.
To further highlight the stance of international merchant houses when 
facing a crisis, it is worthwhile to cite the report written on the conditions 
of Lombardy’s trade under the Continental System by Krämer, who had 
been elected in 1812 to the Trade Council of Milan.29 for every economic 
sector analyzed, Krämer valued Lombardy’s comparative advantages or 
disadvantages and the market positioning. He wrote that innovations should 
be introduced whenever local workers lacked skills and sufficient demand was 
guaranteed, rarely in the case of Lombardy; whenever skilled workers were 
available at a sufficiently low price, instead, traditional techniques should be 
preferred, and even in case of clear disadvantages sometimes markets could 
be found, in Eastern Europe for example, that could absorb low-quality 
products. What Krämer suggested at a macroeconomic level was simply 
what merchants did in their counting rooms, evaluating investments and 
market conditions in order to implement only those businesses that would 
be profitable. Whenever incentives were averse to a production, a technique 
or a location, resources had to be otherwise put to use.
29 Atti del Consiglio del Commercio. ASM, fondo Commercio, parte moderna, cart. 59.
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Table	3
Mechanization	in	Mulhouse	and	Milan	through	capital	from	Basel
Firm Year
Production
/	pieces30
Year Workforce Year
Cylinder-
printing
Year
Printing-
tables
Kramer	&	
Compagni,	
Milan
1789 16,613 1791
20031
approx.
X
1782-
1807
45
Kramer	&	
Compagni,	
Milan
1817
180
daily32
1817
673
including	
weavers33
1807 1 1817 78
Dollfus,	
Mieg	&	
Cie,
Mulhouse34
1804-1805 34,000 1806 715 1806 1 1804 200
The	 reaction	 of	 international	 merchant	 networks	 to	 the	 diversions	 of	
the	 Continental	 System	 was	 to	 dissolve	 partnerships	 and	 redirect	 capital	
and	 resources	 towards	 the	 regions	 or	 the	 sectors	 that	 guaranteed	 higher	
returns,	maintaining	a	high	grade	of	liquidity	and	averting	whenever	possible	
excessive	 fixed	 capital	 investments.	 The	 trading	 house	 Enrico	 Mylius	 &	
Compagni,	for	example,	dissolved	the	old	partnership	that	connected	it	to	a	
complex	web	of	firms	managing	the	trade	of	linen,	cotton	and	silk	between	
Frankfurt,	Manchester	 and	Milan.35	The	banking	house	was	 then	 founded	
again	as	a	firm	dedicated	mainly	to	silk	trading	and	direct	relationships	to	
the	then	newly	established	and	booming	silk	manufactories	along	the	Rhine,	
30	Data	correspond	to	Continental	“pieces”	(24	m	or	26.3	yards).
31	Letter	 from	 Kramer	 &	 Compagni	 to	 the	Municipality,	 21	 July	 179.	 ABT,	 Fondo	
Famiglie,	Cartella	815.
32	Gazzetta di Milano	122	(1	May	1820).	Archivio	della	Camera	di	Commercio	di	Milano,	
Atti	della	Camera	di	Commercio	di	Milano	riguardanti	le	manifatture	di	cotone.
33	Ibid.
34	Nicolas	Schreck,	“Dollfus-Mieg et Cie. Histoire	d’une	grande	 industrie	cotonnière	
des	origines	à	la	première	guerre	mondiale”,	DMC. Patrimoine mondiale?,	Colmar	2006,	
pp.	15	and	32.
35	Poettinger,	Deutsche Unternehmer im Mailand,	p.	57.
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particularly	in	Elberfeld.36	Such	repositioning	was	so	favourable	that	another	
family	of	bankers	in	Frankfurt,	the	Seufferhelds,	established	a	trading	house	
in	Milan	with	the	same	rationale.37	
As	seen,	the	strategy	of	merchant	houses	on	the	Continent	during	Napoleonic	
times	was	quite	successful.	The	organizational	structure	of	merchant	networks	
was	 best	 suited	 to	 take	 advantage	 of	 constantly	 changing	 conditions	 and	
incentives.	The	picture	did	not	change	with	the	post-Napoleonic	crisis	or	the	
crises	of	the	nineteenth	century	that	followed	regularly.	In	the	course	of	the	
century,	for	example,	Kramer	&	Compagni	became	a	family	business	financed	
and	 run	 by	 Krämer’s	 many	 sons.38	 Its	 management	 maintained	 two	 main	
focuses:	 competitiveness	 through	 innovation	 and	 the	 search	 for	 the	 highest	
returns.	 Investments	were	 decided	 accordingly.	 For	 half	 a	 century	 the	 firm	
represented	 the	 cutting	 edge	 of	 the	 technological	 frontier	 in	Milan,	 but	 its	
activities	varied	continuously.	Already	in	the	mid-1820s	the	printing	activity	
was	abandoned.	Technical	improvements	and	the	use	of	steam	machines	were	
then	 required	 to	 remain	 competitive	 in	 that	 sector,	 but	 these	 investments	
could	not	be	justified	by	the	limited	market	of	Austrian	Lombardy.	The	return	
to	 protectionist	 policies	 had	 raised	 raw	material	 costs	 while	 impairing	 the	
possibility	to	access	wider	foreign	markets.	The	sons	of	Krämer,	in	the	decades	
up	to	 the	1860s,	consequently	organized	the	production	of	machines	 for	 the	
silk	 industry,	 pipes	 and	 fertilizers,	 invested	 in	 banks,	 insurance	 companies	
and	railways,	and	experimented	with	sugar	beets	and	the	raising	of	alternative	
worms	for	silk	production.	The	changing	focus	of	Kramer	&	Compagni	perfectly	
depicts	the	evolution	of	comparative	advantages	in	Lombardy	in	the	first	half	
of	the	nineteenth	century.	During	the	difficult	years	after	the	Restoration,	when	
manufacturing	became	risky	and	hardly	rewarding	due	to	English	competition	
and	Lombardy’s	backwardness,	Kramer	&	Compagni	switched	its	focus	mainly	
towards	 services,	 as	most	 other	Continental	merchant	 houses	 did.	 In	 all	 of	
Continental	Europe,	the	1820s	became	the	years	in	which	banks	and	insurance	
companies	 in	 the	 form	of	 limited	companies	were	 founded,	 collecting	 large	
profits	made	through	manufacturing	and	smuggling	during	Napoleon’s	time.	
Only	later	and	always	in	relation	to	the	booming	sectors	of	the	local	economy	
did	Kramer	&	Compagni	reinvest	in	manufacturing	activities.	As	silk	became	
the	 golden	 thread	on	which	Lombardy’s	 development	 rested,	 an	 innovative	
throwing	machine	a trama filata	 became	 a	 point	 of	 excellence	 of	 the	 firm,	
36	Herbert	Kisch,	From Domestic Manufacture to Industrial Revolution: The Case of the 
Rhineland Textile Districts,	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	1989,	pp.	200-206.
37	Poettinger,	Deutsche Unternehmer im Mailand,	p.	60.
38	Ibid.,	pp.	97-145.
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while	 lead	 pipes,	 uniquely	 produced	 without	 junctures	 and	 to	 be	 used	 for	
gas	illumination	and	canalizations,	became	the	best	seller	amongst	the	firm’s	
products,	thanks	to	the	economic	development	of	Milan	in	the	second	half	of	
the	nineteenth	century.	Agriculture	being,	through	silk,	cheese,	rice	and	grain,	
a	 continuous	 source	 of	 wealth	 for	 Lombardy,	many	 activities	 of	 Kramer	 &	
Compagni	still	centred	around	it,	such	as	the	production	of	fertilizers	and	the	
experiments	on	sugar	beet	production	and	raising	silk	worms.	
As	exemplified,	when	crises	struck,	the	response	of	merchant	networks	was	
always	 the	 same:	 implementing	 innovation	 whenever	 economically	 feasible,	
otherwise	changing	sector	or	even	country	to	follow	the	new	advantages.	Flexibility	
became	a	way	to	profit,	even	during	unrelentingly	changing	circumstances.	
The Waning of Trust: The Real Crisis
During	 the	 eighteenth	 and	 nineteenth	 centuries,	 merchant	 houses	 faced	
rapidly	 changing	 incentives.	 On	 one	 side,	 economic	 policies,	 heavily	
influencing	trade	flows	and	comparative	advantages,	varied	continuously;	on	
the	other	side,	technology	improved	incessantly,	influencing	and	sometimes	
reversing	 comparative	 advantages.	 War	 and	 rapidly	 shifting	 frontiers	
rendered	the	economic	decision	process	even	more	difficult	and	uncertain.	
In	 this	 sense	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 speak	 of	 a	 continuous	 state	 of	 crisis	 due	 to	
endogenous	and	exogenous	shocks.	At	a	microeconomic	level,	though,	these	
erratic	 or	 cyclical	 disturbances	 could	 constitute	 an	 opportunity	 for	 well-
organized	 networks	 and	 entrepreneurs	 willing	 to	 migrate.	 Given	 the	 low	
fixed	to	circulating	capital	ratio	for	most	enterprises	and	the	legal	framework,	
adverse	to	limited	responsibility	and	legal	entities,	founding	a	new	enterprise	
was	 easily	 done	 and	 undone.	 The	 historical	 trait	 of	 the	 “commenda”,	 a	
mercantile	contract	between	associates,	some	contributing	capital	and	others	
personal	capabilities,	for	the	completion	of	a	very	precise	enterprise	limited	in	
time	and	scope,	continued	to	characterize	most	firms.	In	Continental	Europe	
the	democratization	of	capital	and	the	spreading	of	limited	responsibility,	up	
to	the	foundation	of	limited	companies,	due	to	Napoleonic	reforms	did	not	
change	this	business	practice	much.	Whenever	an	entrepreneurial	possibility	
arose,	 loose	 networks	 founded	 a	 new	 firm,	 while	 the	 advent	 of	 changes	
would	bring	about	 its	 closure.	Merchant	networks	 continuously	 expanded	
during	this	period,	accumulating	capital	and	gaining	an	increasing	political	
representation;	 a	 circumstance	 made	 possible	 by	 their	 loose	 and	 netlike	
organizational	 structure	 made	 up	 of	 temporary	 firms,	 cross-investments,	
trust	relations	and	family	ties.
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The	worst	 crisis	 such	 a	 system	 could	 face	was	 not	 related	 to	 changing	
circumstances	 or	 sectorial	 crises,	 but	 personal	 failure,	 the	 end	 of	 credit-
worthiness.	Not	only	was	bankruptcy	the	worst	nightmare	of	an	entrepreneur,	
given	the	interlocking	structure	of	merchant	networks	and	the	prevalence	of	
credit	by	trust,	it	could	impair	the	functioning	of	the	whole	system.	It	might	
be	interesting	to	cite	a	last	case,	to	exemplify	how	networks	reacted	to	such	a	
kind	of	failure.	
The	merchant	house	Pietro	Simonetta	had	been	part	of	 the	network	of	
Enrico	Mylius	&	Compagni	since	the	foundation	of	Milan’s	first	insurance	
firm	 as	 a	 limited	 company	 in	 1825,	 a	 relationship	 strengthened	 by	 the	
common	 venture	 in	 Upper	 Austria	 during	 the	 1830s.	 In	 1854,	 a	 year	 of	
crisis	 for	 Lombardy’s	 economy,	 the	 house	 of	 Simonetta	 had	 to	 undergo	
liquidation,	having	lost	its	credit.39	The	relevance	of	this	house	can	be	inferred	
from	 the	 list	 of	 personal	 belongings	 that	Karl	 Leopold	 Simonetta,	 near	 to	
death	 in	consequence	of	 the	bankruptcy,	 left	 to	his	wife,	 including	 several	
diamonds	 and	 canvases	 by	 “Barbieri”	 (Il	 Guercino),	 and	 to	 friends,	 for	
example	a	painting	by	Velázquez.	The	failure	of	such	a	house	could	have	had	
terrible	consequences	on	Milan’s	market,	already	afflicted	by	a	crisis	in	wine	
production	and	a	general	decline	of	trade.	Pertaining	to	the	same	network,	
the	head	of	the	house	of	Mylius	decided	therefore	to	step	in,	guaranteeing	
all	of	Simonetta’s	debts.	He	thus	permitted	the	brothers	of	Karl	Leopold	to	
maintain	 their	 trade	 in	Milan,	while	his	 son	continued	 the	manufacturing	
activity	 in	 Austria,	 even	 if	 under	 the	 tutelage	 of	 Mylius	 and	 Vonwiller.	
Liquidation	could	proceed,	avoiding	a	general	 credit	 crisis,	while	 the	 trust	
level	of	the	market	was	preserved.	
The	case	described	was	not	unique.	Through	personal	 interventions	or	
collective	guaranteeing,	 the	worst	 cases	of	default	were	circumscribed	and	
solved	with	little	damage	to	the	entire	system.	The	strategies	of	international	
networks	towards	crises	emerge,	in	their	entirety:	business	cycles	and	changes	
in	 comparative	 advantages	 were	 countered	 with	 a	 continuous	 innovating	
activity	guided	by	a	precise	economic	calculus,	while	single	bankruptcies	and	
their	consequences	on	trust	and	credit	conditions	were	limited	to	a	minimum,	
firstly	 by	 closing	down	unprofitable	 firms	 before	 default,	 and	 secondly	 by	
managing	the	eventual	liquidation	process	so	as	to	avoid	a	general	panic.	
Given	these	business	structures,	and	the	practices	and	strategies	employed	
by	merchant	networks,	wherever	 and	whenever	 the	merchant	 community	
was	large	enough	to	control	a	market,	as	in	nineteenth-century	Lombardy,	a	
very	stable	economic	system	developed,	efficiency-oriented,	but	at	the	same	
time	capable	of	reducing	to	a	minimum	the	cases	of	failure.
39	Ibid.,	p.	179.
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Conclusions
During	 the	 nineteenth	 century,	 within	 merchant	 networks,	 the	 decision	
process	 was	 mainly	 based	 on	 international	 comparisons	 of	 costs	 and,	 in	
consequence,	on	comparative	advantages.	Firms	were	founded	and	resources	
moved	 according	 to	 the	 results	 of	 such	 comparisons,	 stimulating	 the	
international	specialization	of	production	and	increasing	the	overall	efficiency	
of	 the	 economy.	 The	 netlike	 organizational	 structure	 of	 merchant	 houses	
maintained	a	high	grade	of	flexibility:	investments	in	costly	fixed	equipment	
were	made	only	cautiously,	and	innovations	were	introduced	only	if	rewarding.	
The	stability	of	the	system	was	further	preserved	by	closing	down	firms	that	
became	 unprofitable,	 selecting	 entrepreneurs	 according	 to	 their	 knowledge	
and	capacities	and	leaving	locations	that	had	lost	their	advantages.	
The	evidence	presented	clearly	shows	how	this	organizational	structure	
perceived	crises	and	reacted	to	them.	Sectorial	 imbalances	could	become	a	
source	of	entrepreneurial	opportunities,	exploited	through	temporarily	set	up	
networks	or	firms,	collecting	resources	according	to	the	changed	incentives.	
If	 crises,	 though,	 struck	 already	 established	 initiatives,	 the	 response	 of	
merchant	houses	could	be	to	redirect	investments	towards	other	sectors	or	to	
migrate	following	the	new	advantages.
In	 Continental	 Europe,	 the	 increasing	 diffusion,	 wealth	 and	 political	
power	of	merchants	up	to	the	end	of	 the	nineteenth	century	attest	 to	how	
profitable	such	a	decision	process	was	for	the	networks	involved.	In	Milan	
international	networks	of	German	origin	funnelled	precious	entrepreneurial	
capital,	techniques	and	financial	means	into	traditional	sectors,	such	as	silk,	
and	 into	protected	ones,	 such	as	cotton.	They	also	exploited	 the	profitable	
trade	in	linen	with	Upper	Austria,	further	strengthened	by	direct	investments	
and	entrepreneurial	migration.	
The	main	crisis	such	a	system	would	face	was	the	waning	of	trust,	source	of	
credit	and	foundation	of	the	organizational	structure.	Failures	could	generate	a	
domino	effect,	bringing	down	the	whole	system.	Merchants	were	aware	of	the	
danger	and	entrusted	their	networks	with	a	function	of	containment	in	case	
one	of	 the	 associated	houses	was	 constrained	by	 liquidation	or	bankruptcy.	
Insolvencies	were	thus	limited	to	a	minimum	and	their	effect	on	the	system	
contained	by	collective	guaranteeing	and	personal	warranties.
Only	where	the	personal	responsibility	of	entrepreneurs	and	the	collective	
responsibility	 of	 networks	 were	 lacking,	 in	 consequence	 of	 the	 diffusion	
of	 banking	 credit	 and	 limited	 companies,	 would	 the	 abuses	 of	 industrial	
association	 cause	 recurring	 economic	 crises	 as	 in	 the	United	States,	Great	
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 11/01/2020 02:07:46 |
 Crises and Merchant Networks in the Nineteenth Century 31
Britain	 and	 France.40	 On	 the	 contrary,	 whenever	 and	 wherever	merchant	
houses	 controlled	 the	 investment	decisions	process,	 they	not	only	became	
an	 indispensable	 means	 of	 diffusing	 economic	 efficiency	 by	 redirecting	
resources	towards	the	most	profitable	activities,	but	also	a	stabilizer	against	
the	excesses	of	 speculation,	granting	 long-term	economic	development,	 as	
the	case	of	Lombardy	amply	demonstrates.
Bocconi University, Milan
40	Francesco	Restelli,	“Memoria	in	risposta	al	quesito.	Qual	è	l’influenza	delle	associazioni	
industriali	e	commerciali	sulla	prosperità	pubblica?	Quali	sarebbero	i	più	congrui	mezzi	per	
tutelarle?”,	Giornale dell’I. R. Istituto Lombardo di Scienze, Lettere ed Arti	31	(1845),	p.	60.
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